We consider collective decision problems given by a pro…le of single-peaked preferences de…ned over the real line and a set of pure public facilities to be located on the line. In this context, Bochet and Gordon (2012) provide a large class of priority rules based on e¢ ciency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each such rule is described by a …xed priority ordering among interest groups. We show that any priority rule which treats agents symmetrically -anonymity-, respects some form of coherence across collective decision problems -reinforcement-and only depends on peak informationpeak-only-, is a weighted majoritarian rule. Each such rule de…nes priorities based on the relative size of the interest groups and speci…c weights attached to locations. We give an explicit account of the richness of this class of rules.
Introduction
We consider a generalization of the unidimensional voting model studied by Black (1948) , Moulin (1980) , and Barberà and Jackson (1994) . A collective decision problem is given by a set of agents, a pro…le of single-peaked preferences de…ned over the real line, and a set of pure public facilities to be located on the line. 1 As is standard in the mechanism design literature, we look for rules which can solve any collective decision problem. In this setup, Bochet and Gordon (2012) characterize a rich class of rules based on the combination of e¢ ciency, object-population monotonicity, and sovereignty. While e¢ ciency is a standard notion, the last two properties are new. Objectpopulation monotonicity states that if newcomers join a collective decision problem and, at the same time, the number of public facilities increase to compensate for this arrival, then agents already in the initial problem cannot be hurt. Suppose next that a single facility must be located. Sovereignty states that any location could be chosen provided that an appropriately selected, and possibly large, interest group defending this particular location is brought into the problem. Each rule which jointly satis…es these three properties is a priority rule that selects locations based on a …xed priority ordering among interest groups.
An appealing feature of the class of priority rules is the simplicity with which these rules can be described. However, as will be made clear in Section 3, the class contains some rules which either give too much power to some agents, or exhibit inconsistencies across speci…c collective decision problems. We suggest to put some order in this class by imposing that a rule treat agents symmetricallyanonymity -and respect some form of coherence across collective decision problems -reinforcement.
Anonymity is a well-known property imposing that agents'label do not matter. Reinforcement is a property of stability with respect to merging of collective decision problems. It states that if for two problems -di¤ering possibly on the cardinality of the set of agents and their preferences -the rule selects the same locations, then it should be invariant for the new collective decision problem obtained by merging the two initial problems. This property is, however, not new and already appears in the literature on characterizations of scoring rules -see e.g. Young (1975) or Myerson (1995) . Along with a natural informational simplicity property -peak-only -, any rule in Bochet and Gordon's class that satis…es anonymity and reinforcement is a weighted majoritarian rule. Each such rule de…nes priorities based on speci…c weights attached to interest groups. The weight of any interest group relative to another depends on their densities and most preferred locations. The simplest example is the rule which takes into account only the density of each interest group and gives priority to groups with the highest density. We call these simple majoritarian rules. However, the class is much larger. For instance, a rule can assign di¤erent weights to di¤erent interest groups based on the regions in which they are located. Also, rules can incorporate additional features such as the distance between the most preferred locations of the interest groups and a reference point. So while each rule in our class is "density-based", additional information can be used.
The problem of locating multiple public facilities was …rst introduced by Miyagawa (1998, 2001 ) in the case of two facilities. Ehlers (2002 Ehlers ( , 2003 , Bochet and Gordon (2012) , Heo (2012) , Ehlers and Gordon (2011) provide axiomatic characterizations for this model. Umezawa (2012) considers the location of two facilities on a tree network. Beviá (2002, 2005) and Ju (2008) show the existence of a rule satisfying interesting normative properties. Our main contribution to this literature is the analysis of the implications of the reinforcement axiom in this context and the characterization of the weighted majoritarian rules.
The plan of the paper is the following. In Section 2, we introduce the model. In Section 3, we introduce the properties we study, the class of priority rules and provide several illustrating examples. In Section 4, we prove our central result. Finally, we conclude in Section 5 by illustrating the richness of the characterized class of rules.
The Model and Notations
There is a countably in…nite set N of potential agents. A population N is a …nite and nonempty subset of N. The population is collectively endowed with k 1 identical public facilities, each to be located on the real line R. A typical location on R is denoted by x: An assignment is a menu of locations, i.e., a …nite subset X R. A k-assignment is an assignment for exactly k facilities, i.e., a subset X R such that jXj = k. Let X k be the class of all k-assignments. In particular, a 1-assignment is a single location x 2 R, so that X 1 = R. Let X [ k 1 X k be the class of all assignments.
Each agent i 2 N has a preference R i over X , which is a weak ordering (re ‡exive, transitive and complete) over X . Let P i and I i be, respectively, the strict ordering and indi¤erence relation derived from R i . A preference R i is single-peaked if the following hold:
i) There is a location p (R i ), such that for all x; y 2 R satisfying either x < y p(R i ) or p (R i ) y > x, we have y P i x: The location p (R i ) is called the peak of preference R i :
ii) For all X; Y 2 X ; we let X R i Y if there is x 2 X such that for all y 2 Y; we have x R i y.
The …rst condition is the standard single-peakedness notion for preferences over single locations on the real line. The second condition extends the preferences from single locations to menus. 2 We restrict attention to the class R of single-peaked preferences over X . A preference pro…le, R N , speci…es a population N and the preferences of all agents in N , i.e., R N = (R i ) i2N 2 R N . For each pro…le R N and each nonempty
For each k 1, let P k be the set of preference pro…les R N such that k jp (R N )j, i.e., the number of distinct peak locations in R N is at least k. A problem is a pair (k; R N ) such that k 1 and R N 2 P k . 3 A rule is a sequence f = ff 1 ; f 2 ; : : :g of mappings f k : P k !X k : For each problem (k; R N ), the rule f prescribes an assignment in X k . 4 For each k 1; the set of mappings f k is X P k k : Therefore, the set of all rules is
Main Axioms and Priority Rules
Consider a pro…le R N 2 R N and x; y 2 R. For all X; Y 2 X , we say that X weakly
2 There are di¤erent ways to extend preferences over points to preferences over sets. Consistent with the de…nition of a public facility used in this paper, we consider the max-extension of preferences used by Miyagawa (2001) . 3 The restriction k jp (R N )j allows us to focus on non-trivial cases. When k > jp (R N )j ; it is possible to locate one facility at each peak location, so that the welfare of each agent is maximized. Locating the remaining facilities does not a¤ect any agent's welfare. 4 Our de…nitions rule out locating more than one facility at the same point. Under single-peaked preferences, and for the class of problems we consider, Pareto-e¢ ciency would exclude duplication anyway.
Our …rst axiom is the usual e¢ ciency axiom.
A rule f satis…es e¢ ciency if, for each problem (k; R N ), there is no k-assignment
A pro…le R N is peak-unanimous if all preferences of this pro…le have the same peak, i.e., p (R N ) is singleton. Let T be the set of peak-unanimous pro…les.
A rule f satis…es object-population monotonicity if, for each problem (k; R N ) with k < jp(R N )j, for each peak-unanimous pro…le
A rule f satis…es sovereignty if, for each pro…le R N , each location x 2 R n f 1 (R N ), and each population L, there exists a peak-unanimous pro…le R M 2 T such that M is disjoint from both L and N , and
On the one hand, in the situation of a population and resource increase, objectpopulation monotonicity protects the rights of the …rst-comers. On the other hand, in the situation of a population increase, sovereignty protects the rights of the newcomers. Bochet and Gordon (2012) show that the combination of e¢ ciency, objectpopulation monotonicity and sovereignty characterizes a subclass of priority rules. To de…ne these rules, we need to introduce a class of binary relations called priorities over any nonempty subset S of T . We say that any two peak-unanimous pro…les R N and R M are non-overlapping if they have distinct peaks and disjoint populations, i.e., p (R N ) 6 = p (R M ) and N \ M = ;. The binary relation over S is almost complete if for all R N ; R M 2 S, we have (R N R M or R M R N ) () (R N and R M are non-overlapping). 5 It is almost transitive if for all pro…les
The binary relation is a priority over S if it is asymmetric, almost transitive and almost complete. 6 For each nonempty S T ; let P S be the set of priorities over S:
For any pro…le R N , the peak-unanimous subpro…le
. Since any two distinct maximal peak-unanimous subpro…les 5 In particular, an almost complete binary relation over T is never re ‡exive. 6 A priority is not a partial order, as it is not fully transitive. However, priorities have the following important property. The restriction of a priority on any set S of peak-unanimous and non-overlapping pro…les is a strict ordering. If this set is …nite, the priority has a greatest (or top) element in S. A top element for typically does not generally exist on a set of peak-unanimous pro…les whose elements are not non-overlapping, even if it is a …nite set.
are non-overlapping, the set of maximal peak-unanimous subpro…les of some pro…le can be strictly ordered by any priority.
For each 2 P T , the priority rule f associated with is de…ned as follows. Let (k; R N ) be a problem. The priority strictly ranks the maximal peak-unanimous subpro…les in the decomposition of R N and f k (R N ) selects the peak locations of the top k maximal peak-unanimous subpro…les for . That is,
, and for all two maximal peak-unanimous
Let F be the class of priority rules.
We now introduce two properties that a priority ordering may satisfy. A priority is almost monotonic if there are no four peak-unanimous pro…les
A priority is sovereign if the following two conditions hold. (i) For all peak-unanimous R H ; R K such that R H R K ; and for any population L, there exists a peak-unanimous pro…le R M such that M is disjoint from K and L; and satis…es
and each population L, there exists a peak-unanimous pro…le R M such that M \ L = ;, and satis…es p (R M ) = x and R M R H .
Next, we provide an example of a priority that is not sovereign.
Example 1 Left-peaks priority / Right-peaks priority A priority is the left-peaks priority if for all non-overlapping pro…les
Similarly, is the right-peaks priority if for all non-overlapping pro…les
We now state Bochet and Gordon (2012)'s central result.
Theorem 1 A rule f satis…es e¢ ciency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty if and only if it is a priority rule whose priority is almost monotonic and sovereign.
The proof of this result can be found in Bochet and Gordon (2012) . We now give examples of priorities attached to rules described in Theorem 1.
Example 2 Hierarchical priorities
A priority is hierarchical if the following holds: (i) There is a weak ordering D of all agents in N, such that, for all non-overlapping pro…les
(ii) For each D-indi¤erence class K, consider the class T K of peakunanimous pro…les R M such that the agents in M who are ranked highest according to D belong to K. On each such class T K , the priority coincides with either the left-peaks or the right-peaks priority. If each D-indi¤erence class is a singleton, the priority is a serial dictatorship. Also, if there is a single D-indi¤erence class, the priority is either the left-peaks or the right-peaks priority.
Note that a hierarchical priority, as described in Example 2, is sovereign (and therefore satis…es all the properties in Theorem 1) if and only if the weak ordering D has no maximal element.
Example 3 Simple majoritarian priorities
For each n 1, the tie-breaking rule n within each class of the form T n = fR N 2 T : jN j = ng can be given by any strict ordering over locations in R. For example, we could require n to be the left-peaks priority for all n (left majoritarian priority) or the right-peaks priority for all n (right majoritarian priority).
Unlike the rules described by simple majoritarian priorities, the rules described by hierarchical priorities allow for an asymmetric treatment of agents, i.e., agents' labels matter. We would like rules to respect an anonymous treatment of agents' preferences.
A rule f satis…es anonymity if for all k 1 and problems (k; R N ) and
Anonymity imposes an additional requirement on priorities. A priority is anonymous if it satis…es the following condition. For all R M ; R N ; R Notice that if anonymity is dropped, the class of rules which satisfy e¢ ciency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty will include rules whose priorities combine Examples 2 and 3 in interesting ways. We give below two such examples. 
Example 4
such that for all non-overlapping R M ; R N 2 T , we have
For cases where equality holds, the tie-breaking rule within each v level curve of the form fR N 2 T : P i2N ! i = vg is determined by some strict ordering B over locations, independent of v. In Bochet and Gordon (2012), it is shown that the set of priority rules described by hierarchical priorities is equivalent to the set of strategy-proof priority rules.
In contrast, there are only two hierarchical priorities that are anonymous: leftpeaks and right-peaks priorities. But left-peaks and right-peaks priorities are not sovereign. Thus, anonymity, sovereignty and strategy proofness are mutually inconsistent within the class of priority rules. If we do not impose anonymity, then the class of rules characterized by all other properties (i.e. e¢ ciency, object-population monotonicity, sovereignty, reinforcement and peak-only) will include every hierarchical rule whose associated priority is sovereign. 8 Adding anonymity excludes rules like serial dictatorship that violate the pure notion of majoritarianism. But it also excludes some rules which balance agents'priorities with the notion of majoritarianism -e.g. the priority introduced in Example 5. 9 We now introduce additional examples of priority rules which also satisfy anonymity.
Example 6 Two-regions majoritarian priorities
A priority is two-regions majoritarian if there is a location x 0 2 R (that separates the two regions), and a coe¢ cient x 0 2 (0; 1] such that, for all non-overlapping R M ;
For each v x 0 , the tie-breaking rule v within each class of the form
can be given by any strict ordering over locations in R. For example, we could require v to be the left-peaks priority for all T v (left-two-regions majoritarian priority) or the right-peaks priority for all T v (right-two-regions majoritarian priority).
Example 7 Centralist majoritarian priorities
A priority is centralist majoritarian if there is a location x 0 2 R (the "center") and an index u : f1; 2; :::g R + ! R, where u (n; d) is weakly increasing in n and weakly decreasing in d, with lim n!+1 u (n; d) = +1, such that for all non-overlapping R M ; R N 2 T ; we have
8 Suppose we do not impose anonymity but add strategy-proofness instead to e¢ ciency, objectpopulation monotonicity and sovereignty. The class of rules characterized by these four axioms coincides with hierarchical rules whose priorities are sovereign. Notice that hierarchical priority rule whose priorities are sovereign satisfy reinforcement and peak-only. Adding reinforcement and peak-only has thus no re…ning e¤ect on this characterization. 9 The priority in Example 4 does not satisfy both anonymity and reinforcement.
For each v 2 R, the tie-breaking rule v within each class of the form
can be any strict ordering over locations in R. For example, we could require v to be the left-peaks priority for all T v (left-centralist majoritarian priority) or the right-peaks priority for all T v (right-centralist majoritarian priority).
There are many possible functions u for a centralist majoritarian priority rule. For example, with
where > 0, the priority rule f behaves across problems in a way that is not coherent. That is, if for two problems -di¤ering possibly on the cardinality of the set of agents, and on preferences -the rule selects the same locations, then the selection operated by f may change for the new collective decision problem obtained by merging the two initial problems. For instance, let x 0 = 1, = 0:1 and consider the problems (1;
We are interested in rules with the following coherence property: if two problems deliver the same location(s), the problem obtained from merging them still delivers the same location(s).
A rule f satis…es reinforcement if for all k 1 and each pair of pro…les R N ,
That is, whenever any two di¤erent problems (k; R N ) and (k; R M ) select the same k locations, then reinforcement requires that the location of the k facilities should not change in the problem (k; R N [ R M ).
We add one last property that will be used for our main result.
A rule f satis…es peak-only if for all k 1 and problems (k; R N ) and
Peak-only is an informational simplicity requirement which states that only the information regarding the peaks of agents should be used. It is, however, a strong assumption as it ignores every other aspect of agents'preference orderings. Nevertheless, if we do not impose peak-only, then the class of priority rules characterized by all other properties (i.e. e¢ ciency, object-population monotonicity, sovereignty, anonymity and reinforcement) will include rules that put arbitrary weights on preference orderings. This forms a rich class of rules where weights can depend in complicated ways on the full preference relations. Examples of such rules are those described by the following priorities:
Example 8 Symmetry biased majoritarian priorities We say that a single-peaked preference R i is symmetric if for all x; y 2 R, we have xR i y () jx p(R i )j jy p(R i )j. For any peak-unanimous pro…le R N 2 T , let (R N ) be the number of agents i 2 N such that R i is symmetric.
A priority is symmetry biased majoritarian if there is > 0 such that for all non-overlapping
For each n 1, the tie-breaking rule n within each class of the form T n = fR N 2 T : (R N ) + jN j = ng can be given by any strict ordering over locations in R. For example, we could require n to be the left-peaks priority for all n or the right-peaks priority for all n.
Thus, imposing peak-only excludes "undesirable" rules like those described by symmetry biased majoritarian priorities. Our position here is that peak-only is a relevant requirement when agents'peaks (but not preferences) are commonly known. Indeed, in many instances, peak information is di¢ cult to manipulate because it re ‡ects some observable attributes -e.g. because it re ‡ects an agent's address. Under this interpretation, peak-only is an invariance condition with respect to some preference change. 10 
A Characterization of Weighted Majoritarian Rules
We now introduce a family of priority rules that we call weighted majoritarian rules. Let R ++ and Q ++ respectively be the set of positive reals and the set of positive rationals.
A priority is a weighted majoritarian priority if there exists an asymmetric and transitive binary relation, i.e. a strict partial order . on R; and a function q : R 2 ! R ++ with q(x; y)q(y; x) = 1, q(x; z) = q(x; y)q(y; z); and q (x; y) 2 Q ++ () (either x.y or y .x); for all distinct x; y and z, such that for any two non-overlapping peak-unanimous pro…les R M and R L , we have R M R L if either 1.
Note that the tie-breaking rule . is only needed if the image of q contains at least one rational number; otherwise, the equality jM j jLj = q(p(R M ); p(R L )) does not hold for any two peak-unanimous pro…les R M and R L .
Theorem 3 A rule f satis…es e¢ ciency, object-population monotonicity, sovereignty, anonymity, reinforcement and peak-only if and only if there exists a weighted majoritarian priority such that f is priority rule associated with .
Proof. It is straightforward to prove the if part, i.e., if there exists a weighted majoritarian priority such that f is a priority rule associated with , then f satis…es all the axioms listed in the theorem. We prove the only if part.
It follows from Theorem 1 that if f satis…es e¢ ciency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty, then there exists a priority such that f is a priority rule associated with . We show that is a weighted majoritarian priority.
Pick any two locations x; y 2 R such that x > y.
Step
By peak-only and anonymity, we get that
yg, where the set inclusion follows because f is a priority rule.
Pick a (n 1 ; n 2 ) 2 Z 2 + n(0; 0), where Z + is the set of nonnegative integers. If n 1 > 0 and n 2 = 0, then let R N 1 be any peak-unanimous pro…le such that p(R N 1 ) = x and jN 1 j = n 1 . If n 1 = 0 and n 2 > 0, then let R N 2 be any peak-unanimous pro…le such that p(R N 2 ) = y and jN 2 j = n 2 . If n 1 ; n 2 > 0, then let (R 
The argument in the previous paragraph implies that g xy is a well-de…ned function over the domain Z 2 + n(0; 0). Now, we extend the domain of g (x;y) from Z 2 + n(0; 0) to Q 2 + n(0; 0), where Q + is the set of nonnegative rational numbers. For any positive integer n de…ne g xy n 1 n ; n 2 n = g xy (n 1 ; n 2 ). This is well-de…ned because for any two
where the last equality follows from reinforcement. Note that by this extension, g xy is de…ned for any pair of rational numbers (q 1 ; q 2 ) 2 Q 2 + n(0; 0) since any such (q 1 ; q 2 ) equals = g xy (ñ n 1 +ñ 1 n;ñ n 2 ) = g xy ((ñ n 1 ;ñ n 2 ) + (ñ 1 n; 0)) ;
where the second and the fourth equalities follow from reinforcement. However, g xy (ñ n 1 ;ñ n 2 ) = g xy (n 1 ; n 2 ) = g xy n 1 n ; n 2 n = fxg (the …rst equality follows from reinforcement) and g xy (ñ 1 n; 0) = fxg. Once again, reinforcement implies that g xy ((ñ n 1 ;ñ n 2 ) + (ñ 1 n; 0)) = fxg and so we are done.
Step 2. De…ne q + (x; y) = supfq 1 2 Q + : g xy (q 1 ; 1) = fygg q (x; y) = inffq 1 2 Q + : g xy (q 1 ; 1) = fxgg:
We argue that 1 > q + (x; y) = q (x; y) > 0. It is easy to see that q + (x; y) < 1 since sovereignty implies that there exists an integer n 1 > 0 such that g xy (n 1 ; 1) = fxg and the last result in Step 1 implies that g xy (q 1 ; 1) = fxg for all rational q 1 n 1 . Likewise, q (x; y) > 0 since sovereignty implies that there exists an integer n 2 > 0 such that g xy (1; n 2 ) = fyg. However, g xy (1; n 2 ) = g xy 1 n 2 ; 1 and so the last result in Step 1 implies that g xy (q 1 ; 1) = fyg for all rational q 1 1 n 2 . It must be that q + (x; y) q (x; y) because otherwise there exists a q 1 2 Q + such that q (x; y) < q 1 < q + (x; y). If g xy (q 1 ; 1) = fxg, then the last result in
Step 1 implies that g xy ((x; y), a contradiction. Now, suppose q + (x; y) < q (x; y) and let q 1 2 Q + such that q + (x; y) < q 1 < q (x; y).
By de…nition of q + (x; y), it must be that g xy (q 1 ; 1) = fxg whereas by de…nition of q (x; y) it must be that g xy (q 1 ; 1) = fyg, a contradiction. Hence, we conclude that q + (x; y) = q (x; y).
De…ne q(x; y) = q + (x; y) = q (x; y) and q(y; x) = 1 q(x;y)
. Next, de…ne the binary relation . as follows: if q(x; y) is irrational, then x and y are not comparable for .: If q(x; y) is rational and g xy (q(x; y); 1) = fxg, then x . y, whereas if q(x; y) is rational and g xy (q(x; y); 1) = fyg, then y . x.
Step 3. Pick any two peak-unanimous and non-overlapping pro…les R M and R L such that p(R M ) = x and p(R L ) = y. Since f is a priority rule associated with , we know that
In Step 1, we have argued that f 1 (R M ; R L ) = g xy (jM j; jLj) = g xy jM j jLj ; 1 .
By de…nition of the function q(:; :), it follows that if 
Step 4. Next, we argue that q(x; z) = q(x; y)q(y; z); 8x 6 = y 6 = z. Let
be a sequence of rational numbers such that
q(x; y) and lim n!1
a sequence of rational numbers such that
q(y; z) and lim n!1 n 2 (n) n 2 (n) = q(y; z). Let R Mn , R Ln and R Kn be three peak-unanimous and non-overlapping pro…les such that p(R Mn ) = x, p(R Ln ) = y and p(R Kn ) = z, and jM n j = n n 1 (n) n 2 (n) + 2 n 1 (n) n 2 (n), jL n j = n n 2 (n) ñ 1 (n) + n 2 (n) and jK n j = n ñ 1 (n) ñ 2 (n). Consider the problem (1; (R Mn ; R Ln ; R Kn )). We have
q(x; y) and
> q(y; z). Therefore, from the arguments in Step 3, it follows that R Mn R Ln and R Ln R Kn . Then we must have R Mn R Kn since is a priority, which is almost transitive. This implies that jMnj jKnj q(x; z); 8n. However, lim n!1 jMnj jKnj = q(x; y)q(y; z), and therefore, q(x; y)q(y; z) q(x; z). We can similarly argue that q(z; y)q(y; x) q(z; x) =) 1 q(z;x) 1 q(z;y) 1 q(y;x) =) q(x; z) q(y; z)q(x; y) and therefore, we must have q(x; z) = q(x; y)q(y; z).
Step 5. Finally, we argue that . is asymmetric and transitive. As de…ned, . is clearly asymmetric and compares any two distinct locations x and y such that q (x; y) is rational. We show that it is also transitive. Suppose x 6 = y 6 = z are such that x . y and y .z. This implies that q(x; y) and q(y; z) are rational numbers. Let q(x; y) = n 1 n 1 and q(y; z) = n 2 n 2 . Let R M , R L and R K be peak-unanimous and non-overlapping pro…les such that p(R M ) = x, p(R L ) = y and p(R K ) = z, and jM j = n 1 n 2 , jLj = n 2 ñ 1 and jKj =ñ 1 ñ 2 . Consider the problem (1; (R M ; R L ; R K )). We have = q(x; y)q(y; z) = q(x; z). So it must be that x . z.
Concluding Remarks
Richness: We conclude by illustrating the richness of the class of rules associated with weighted majoritarian priorities. A simple majoritarian priority (Example 3) is a weighted majoritarian priority if and only if it uses the same tie-breaking rule across all indi¤erence classes and this tie-breaking rule is de…ned by a strict complete order . on R such that for any n and any peak-unanimous and non-overlapping pro…les R L ; R K 2 T n , we have R L n R K () p(R L ) . p(R K ). 11 The same is true for a two regions majoritarian priority (Example 6), i.e., it is a weighted majoritarian priority if and only if there exists a strict partial order . on R such that for any v and any peak-unanimous and non-overlapping pro…les R L ; R K 2 T v , we have R L v R K () p(R L ).p(R K ). 12 Thus, in particular, the left majoritarian, right majoritarian, left-two-regions majoritarian, and right-two-regions majoritarian priorities are weighted majoritarian priorities. Similarly, the centralist majoritarian priority (Example 7) with u such that there exists a decreasing positive function (d) such that u (n; d) = n (d), is a weighted majoritarian priority if the same tiebreaking rule is used across all indi¤erence classes and is de…ned by a strict partial order on R.
13
Extensions: It is clear from Examples 5 and 8 that dropping either anonymity or peak-only from the characterization o¤ered in Theorem 3 leads to a non-trivial enlargement of the class of rules. We o¤er a discussion on this issue in an online supplement where we also provide some partial characterizations of the classes of rules obtained when one drops either of the aforementioned axioms, or both. 14 
